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Surrogacy and Silence: Why State Legislatures Should Attempt to Regulate Surrogacy Contracts
Melissa A. Cartine
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2011, television personalities and married couple, Giuliana and Bill Rancic, revealed
their struggle to have a child on their television show “Giuliana and Bill.”1 The couple had
struggled for several years to get pregnant through in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), which is one
method of assisted reproductive technology (“ART”).2 In 2012, Giuliana was diagnosed with
breast cancer and although treatment was successful for her cancer, she would not be able to
conceive on her own due to cancer treatments.3 As the couple desperately wanted to be parents,
they opted for another form of ART, surrogacy.4 Genetically, Giuliana is the mother of the
resulting child.5 Her eggs were combined with her husband’s sperm to form an embryo that was
implanted into the surrogate.6 This type of surrogacy is called gestational surrogacy.7
The surrogacy process was successful for Giuliana and Bill as they now have a healthy,
thriving baby boy.8 While the couple’s story appears inspiring, the process can be riddled with
legal complexity due to a lack of statutory regulation. In the United States, a majority of state
legislatures have remained silent as to the legality of surrogacy contracts and as to the question

1

Natalie Finn, Giuliana and Bill Rancic Welcome a Baby Boy,
http://www.eonline.com/news/338760/giuliana-and-bill-rancic-welcome-a-baby-boy.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Perri Koll, The Use of the Intent Doctrine to Expand the Rights of Intended Homosexual Male
Parent in Surrogacy Custody Disputes, 18 J.L. & Gender 199, 203 (2011).
8
Natalie Finn, Giuliana and Bill Rancic Welcome a Baby Boy,
http://www.eonline.com/news/338760/giuliana-and-bill-rancic-welcome-a-baby-boy.
1

of parental rights when such contracts are signed.9 The failure of state legislatures to regulate in
this area leaves parties without guidance and can ultimately harm well-meaning parents and
innocent children.10
Several state courts have developed tests to determine parental rights when surrogacy
contracts have been entered into because the state legislatures were silent on the issue. New
Jersey state courts have banned surrogacy contracts as a matter of public policy.11 California has
consistently used an intent-based test, which considers the intending parents that initiated the
surrogacy process, to be the legal the parents.12 Alternatively, Ohio departed from an intentbased test and adopted a genetic-based test, which considers the genetic link between the parent
and the child to be the dispositive factor in deciphering parental rights.13 A few states have
attempted to regulate surrogacy contracts, either by banning them or taking a selective approach
in regards to what types of surrogacy contracts the state will render enforceable.14
While the lack of regulation of surrogacy contracts does not pose a problem in
unremarkable cases, such legislative silence can have devastating results for some families. If
the surrogacy process goes awry, the parties that entered in to a surrogacy agreement could spend
years litigating over whom the child’s legal parents are.15 As evidenced by the various tests state
courts have adopted, there is not much uniformity from state to state regarding surrogacy. The
unpredictability of what a particular state court might decide makes surrogacy a precarious
9
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method of ART for those in states where no statutory guidance or case law is provided.16 To
address this problem, this article will argue that state legislatures should regulate gestational
surrogacy contracts, including third party gestational arrangements, due to the fact that this
method has seen expansive growth over the last decade and because at least one intending parent
is genetically-linked to the child. In addition to regulating gestational surrogacy contracts, this
article will also advocate for legislation that promotes the integrity of the surrogacy process by
drafting laws that allow for judicial and welfare agency intervention and laws that will protect
the surrogate.
This analysis accomplishes this examination in four parts. Part I will serve as an
introduction to the major legal pitfall of surrogacy contracts, which is a lack of statutory
regulation of such contracts. Part II will provide an overview of gestational and traditional
surrogacy. It will also describe the status quo of surrogacy among the states, which is defined as
a hodgepodge of states that have no statutory regulation or case law at all, states with case law on
point, and the minority of states that have attempted statutory regulation. Part III will discuss
why comprehensive statutory guidance, particularly in regards to gestational surrogacy, will
provide for more predictability in the surrogacy process. Then, it will highlight constitutional
issues raised in surrogacy regulation and advocate for a balance between promoting integrity in
the surrogacy process and protecting one’s right to procreate. Part III will also acknowledge that
some issues involving surrogacy are so legally complex that they may be better addressed
through the court system. Finally, Part IV will restate the stance that state legislatures should
regulate gestational surrogacy contracts so that parties entering in to such agreements can predict
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their legal rights at the outset. It will also reiterate which types of regulations may help to
promote integrity in the surrogacy process.
II.

THE STATUS QUO OF SURROGACY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. GESTATIONAL AND TRADITIONAL SURROGACY

Generally, those seeking to start a family unit have three options: natural conception,
adoption, and surrogacy. Since natural conception may not be an option for many seeking to
start a family, they must revert to the latter two options. Adoption is highly regulated by statute
in all states.17 It is also a lengthy, expensive process and the demand of those wishing to start a
family may be greater than the availability of children that could be adopted.18 Surrogacy, on the
other hand, does not need to be a process much lengthier than natural reproduction.19 Even more
enticing is the fact that if an individual or family opts for gestational surrogacy and utilizes its
own gametes, it has a genetic link with the child, making it the closet option to natural
conception.20 Thus, it is easy to fathom why so many families place their faith in the surrogacy
process despite its potential legal pitfalls due to lack of statutory regulation.
The term surrogacy usually refers to one of two methods: gestational and traditional.
This is the method that the Rancic couple opted for and it usually creates a genetic link between
the child and at least one intending parent contracting to have a surrogate carry their child. As
described previously, a woman’s egg is removed and combined with her partner’s sperm before
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being implanted into a third person, the surrogate.21 If only one or no intending parent can
supply gametes, then third party donors could be used to supply the needed gametes.22 This
would also be considered gestational surrogacy.23 It may be referred to as donor surrogacy or as
a third party gestational arrangement as well.24 In both such arrangements, the surrogate carries
the child to full-term but has no genetic link to the child since her gametes were not used.25
Those that choose to can instead utilize the surrogate’s eggs. 26 This is called traditional
or partial surrogacy and creates a genetic link between the child and the surrogate.27
According to the Society of Assisted Reproductive Technology (“SART”), gestational
surrogacy is the method more frequently used today.28 However, the Council for Responsible
Genetics claims that accurate statistics are not available to deduce how many more people have
utilized this method rather than traditional surrogacy.29 Instead, the Council for Responsible
Genetics found that studies that looked at IVF success rates demonstrate that the rate of
gestational surrogacy has increased dramatically and will continue to do so over time.30 The data
from IVF success rates itself can be used to determine that gestational surrogacy arrangements
have increased because in the gestational surrogacy process, the embryo of the intending parents
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is then implanted via IVF into the surrogate’s uterus.31 The CDC requires ART clinics, which
perform IVF, to report the success rates of IVF cycles and to report when the patient is a
gestational surrogate.32
The Council for Responsible Genetics is hesitant to conclude that gestational surrogacy is
more prevalent than traditional surrogacy because the metric used to determine success rates of
IVF is the IVF cycle.33 The measurement does not consider the individual, so there is no way to
know how many women actually serve as surrogates because when an IVF procedure is not
successful, it goes unreported.34 It is also hesitant to conclude that gestational surrogacy is more
prevalent because no reliable statistics exist to account for how many people utilize the
traditional method of surrogacy.35 As previously highlighted, the Council for Responsible
Genetics did conclude that the rate utilization of gestational surrogacy has increased
dramatically, doubling from 2004-2008.36 It was also comfortable in predicting that the rapid
growth of gestational surrogacy was not likely to slow in the future.37
B. CURRENT CASE LAW AND THE POLICIES THAT INFLUENCED COURTS’
DECISIONS
Silence is the majority approach in regards to surrogacy.38 There are a few states that
attempt to deal with the legal issues that arise in surrogacy via the court system and case law, and
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then, some states that provide legislative guidance in regards to surrogacy.39 There are two
seminal surrogacy cases that are cited extensively: In Re Baby M and Johnson v. Calvert.
The traditional method of surrogacy was used by the Stern family in In re Baby M.40 In
this case, the Sterns entered into a surrogacy agreement whereby Mr. Stern’s sperm was
implanted into the surrogate.41 The Stern family opted to use the surrogate’s eggs due to Mrs.
Stern’s fertility issues, although no court or legal commentary has expounded upon what those
fertility issues were.42 Up until the child was born, the process had been successful for the
Sterns. 43 Then, the surrogate, Mary Beth Whitehead, decided that she wanted to keep the child
and the Sterns sued for parental rights.44 The New Jersey Supreme Court was left to decide who
the child’s parents were as the state legislature provided no statutory guidance on the matter.45
The court invalidated the surrogacy contract between the Sterns and the surrogate based on
public policy implications that it felt stemmed from such agreements.46 The court reasoned that
surrogacy agreements exploited lower income individuals, who would be inclined to use their
bodies for money.47 The protectionist theory that the New Jersey Supreme Court incited in Baby
M is the same theory that has influenced the ban on payments for organ donation.48 Ultimately,
the court used the best interests of the child analysis to determine placement of the child.49 It
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reasoned that placing the child with the Sterns was the best outcome for the child.50 The court
did find the surrogate to be the child’s legal mother, and thus, Mrs. Stern could not adopt Melissa
until she became an adult.51
While protection from exploitation of lower income individuals was a guiding public
policy concern for the New Jersey Supreme Court in Baby M, this is not the only theory that has
been offered in response to the legal issues surrounding surrogacy.52 There is also the feminist
approach, which advocates for the enforceability of surrogacy contracts, under the view that a
woman should have autonomy of her body and the freedom to contract.53
A California court appeared to adopt a more feminist approach, considering the freedom
to contract in its analysis of a surrogacy agreement in Johnson v. Calvert.54 In this case, the
Calverts, seeking to start a family, used the gestational method of surrogacy.55 The court used an
intent-based analysis.56 It reasoned that but-for the Calverts, who had the intent to bring the
child into the world, the child would not exist and, therefore, they were the child’s legal
parents.57
This case is clearly factually different than In Re Baby M, where the Sterns used the
traditional method of surrogacy. The facts in Johnson v. Calvert probably made it more
palatable for the court to find the Calverts to be the child’s legal parents as they had a genetic
link. But the court was unequivocal in regards to the parties’ freedom to contract when it stated,
50
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“[T]he parties voluntarily agreed to participate in in vitro fertilization and related medical
procedures before the child was conceived; at the time when Anna [the surrogate] entered into
the contract, therefore, she was not vulnerable to financial inducements to part with her own
expected offspring.”58 This part of the court’s analysis was less paternalistic than the approach
the New Jersey Supreme took in Baby M, and thus, exemplified another policy that could shape a
court’s decision in a surrogacy case.59
Another case that is illustrative of how a court may decide when presented with a
surrogacy agreement gone awry is Belsito v. Clark. In this case, the Clarks sought to start a
family via the gestational surrogacy method.60 The court did not use the intent-based test of
Johnson v. Calvert but instead looked to the genetic link of the parents to the child.61 The Ohio
court limited the legal parents in a surrogacy agreement to those with a genetic link to the child.62
Although the court’s decision made surrogacy contracts more predictable at the outset, it also
expanded the amount of individuals that could not be deemed to be the legal parents of a child
resulting from gestational surrogacy arrangements.
C. CURRENT STATUTORY REGULATION
1. States That Have Statutorily Banned Surrogacy
A few states and the federal district of Washington, D.C. have banned surrogacy
agreements.63 In Washington, D.C. all surrogacy contracts are unenforceable and the entrance
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into such agreements may result in prison confinement, fines, or potentially both.64 New York
has also banned all surrogacy agreements.65 In the state of New York, the heaviest penalties are
for those who act as intermediaries, which could be anyone who tries to facilitate a surrogacy
contract.66 Michigan also bans surrogacy agreements; its statutory scheme closely resembles
New York’s approach.67 Finally, Arizona, Nebraska, and Louisiana have also statutorily banned
surrogacy contracts.68
2. States with Varied Statutory Approaches
While statutory regulation of surrogacy is the exception rather than the norm in the
United States, a few states have attempted to provide guidance to those seeking to start a family
via surrogacy. Florida allows for gestational agreements but requires that the intending parents
must be married.69 Several other states such as Virginia, Texas, and Nevada have similar
statutory frameworks to Florida regarding gestational agreements.70 North Dakota bans
traditional surrogacy contracts although it allows for gestational contracts.71 Finally, Illinois has
some of the most comprehensive legislation regarding gestational surrogacy agreements.72
Illinois enacted its Gestational Surrogacy Act to standardize various aspects of a
gestational surrogacy agreement. 73 Those seeking to a start a family through this method of
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surrogacy must be doing so out of medical necessity.74 What exactly the Illinois legislature
meant by “medical need” is unclear but since the GSA has been viewed as a more liberal body of
law, it is likely that this term is not meant to be very limiting.75 Illinois is not the only state to
allow for surrogacy only in instances of medical necessity; states such as Florida and Virginia
also use the ambiguous term as a requirement for enforceability of the contract.76 The GSA is
limiting in that it requires that one intending parent supply reproductive cells to be implanted in
the surrogate.77
There has been some criticism of Illinois’s approach, which provides guidance for only
intending parents who can supply gametes.78 It is understandable that some individuals feel this
is unfair, as the intending parents who use only donor gametes are not protected by Illinois’s
GSA.
Another feature of the GSA is that it does have some paternalistic aspects because it
attempts to protect the surrogate via certain eligibility requirements:
(a) A gestational surrogate shall be deemed to have satisfied the requirements of this Act
if she has met the following requirements at the time the gestational surrogacy contract is
executed
(1) she is at least 21 years of age;
(2) she has given birth to at least one child;
(3) she has completed a medical evaluation;
(4) she has completed a mental health evaluation;
750 ILCS §47/20(a)(1)-(4).79 A surrogate must be, at a minimum, 21 years of age. The statute
also mandates health evaluations and requires that the surrogate have previously bore a child.80
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The GSA includes a clause that states that any payment to the surrogate must be placed in an
escrow account before performance. 81 Such regulations may assuage public policy concerns
about a woman exploiting her body and are intended to ensure that a woman does not feel
coerced into entering such a contract.
D. A MODEL ACT: ARTICLE 8 OF THE UNFORM PARENTAGE ACT
Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”) is a model act, which demonstrates how
states may regulate gestational surrogacy contracts.82 First, Article 8 requires judicial
intervention from the beginning of the surrogacy process:
(a) If the requirements of subsection (b) are satisfied, a court may issue an order validating
the gestational agreement and declaring that the intended parents will be the parents of a
child born during the term of the of the agreement.
(b) The court may issue an order under subsection (a) only on finding that:
(1) the residence requirements of Section 802 have been satisfied and the parties have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court under the jurisdictional standards of this
[Act];
(2) medical evidence shows that the intended mother is unable to bear a child or is
unable to do so without unreasonable risk to her physical or mental health or to the
unborn child;
(3) unless waived by the court, the [relevant child-welfare agency] has made a home
study of the intended parents and the intended parents meet the standards of fitness
applicable to adoptive parents.
Unif. Parentage Act § 803 (amended 2002).83 The agreement between intending parents and a
surrogate will only be enforceable if certain requirements are met.84 The language of § 801
allows only a man and woman to be intending parents and both must be privy to the gestational
surrogacy contract.85 Section 803 also has a residency requirement, which is that the mother or
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intending parents of the child must have resided where the surrogacy agreement is to be declared
valid for a minimum of 90 days.86
One of the highly criticized sections of Article 8 is the requirement of a home study,
which is to be conducted by a child welfare agency, of the intended parents.87 Such criticism is
misplaced because, first, the language of § 803 indicates that the court could waive such an
investigation.88 Second, it is important that legislatures err on the side of comprehensive
legislation that protects the best interests of children brought into this world via surrogacy
despite any infringement that might have one’s right to procreate. An example of why home
study is necessary is In re: the Adoption of Infants H.; the case was about a man who was 57years-old when he approached an Indiana surrogacy agency to aid him in becoming a parent.89
Not only were his age and single-person status reasons for concern, but his mental health status
as well.
III.

A CALL FOR STATE LEGISLATURES TO CHANGE THE STATUS QUO
A. REGULATION OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY AGREEMENTS

As discussed previously, SART has concluded that gestational surrogacy is the more
prevalent type of surrogacy, while the Council of Responsible genetics has concluded that the
method of gestational surrogacy has seen rapid growth and has predicted that this trend is not
likely to slow down.90 Since the trend demonstrates rapid growth in the utilization of gestational
surrogacy, pragmatism would suggest that state legislatures should begin to regulate this method
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of surrogacy.91 Another reason gestational surrogacy should be regulated is that courts seem to
grapple less with gestational surrogacy agreements than with traditional surrogacy agreements.92
The genetic link that usually exists between at least one of the intending parents and the child is
likely a predominating factor in why courts find it less daunting to determine parental rights in
these cases.93
Despite the fact that courts do not seem to struggle as much with the legal outcomes in
gestational surrogacy cases, comprehensive regulation is still necessary. This is because it would
be less of a burden on court systems and intending parents in states that do not have case law on
point regarding legal outcomes of gestational surrogacy agreements.94 Statutory regulation that
predicts the parental rights of the intending parties and gestational surrogate at the outset of a
gestational surrogacy agreement could keep the court’s involvement relatively limited. In fact,
the Johnson court pleaded for the California legislature to do just that.95
From a humanistic standpoint, those seeking to start a family utilizing surrogacy likely
have infertility issues or an alternative family unit and have endured enough emotional hardships
as a result. The predictability of parental rights stemming from surrogacy contracts will prevent
more families from experiencing more emotional hardships such as being dragged through years
of litigation to assume parental rights over a child.
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No stance is taken regarding the regulation of traditional surrogacy as other commentary
has.96 A ban on traditional surrogacy would have serious implications for couples where both
partners are infertile and those who cannot afford gestational surrogacy but wish to start a family.
At this point, when such arrangements do not work out, it is important to note that the court
system would be best apt to deal with the challenges presented by such scenarios.
B. BALANCING THE INTEGRITY OF THE SURROGACY PROCESS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
State legislatures may be wary of regulating surrogacy agreements due to the
fundamental rights of the parties involved.97 In the Supreme Court case, Eisenstadt v. Baird,
Justice Brennan stated, “[I]f the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or begat a child.”98 The
infringement of one’s right to privacy and right to procreate is an argument that may be raised
against statutory regulation of surrogacy.99
Regulations from both Illinois’s GSA and Article 8 of the UPA could potentially raise
constitutional issues. As touched upon earlier, Illinois’s GSA, which requires at least one of the
intending parents to provide gametes for the surrogacy agreement to be declared valid, provides
no statutory protection for those who cannot provide gametes.100 To deal with the countervailing
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issue of infringing on one’s right to procreate, the argument has been presented that in the
situation where the intending parents cannot supply gametes, adoption, instead of procreation, is
an available option.101
This argument is not convincing. Intending parents that enter into an agreement with a
gestational surrogate but utilizing donor gametes should be entitled to protection of state laws
because the intending parents are simply partaking in a variation of gestational surrogacy.102
Furthermore, courts should address the legal challenges that arise from surrogacy arrangements
that are not gestational in nature instead of banning entire classes of people from protection of
state laws.
The requirement of § 801 of the UPA may prevent some groups, whether those groups
are non-married couples, homosexual couples, or individuals from entering surrogacy
agreements depending on a state’s interpretation of the model provision.103 Section 801 states
that “[t]he man and the woman who are the intended parents must both be the parties to the
gestational agreement.”104 This provision is an amendment from the UPA’s provision proposed
in 2000, which was that the intending parents needed to be married.105 While the amendment
seems to eliminate the marriage requirement, the provision has been interpreted to mean that
only a man and a woman can be intending parents privy to the gestational agreement.106

101

Paul G. Arshagouni, Be Fruitful and Multiply, By Other Means, if Necessary: The Time Has
Come to Recognize and Enforce Gestational Surrogacy Agreements, at 809.
102
Perri Koll, The Use of the Intent Doctrine to Expand the Rights of Intended Homosexual Male
Parent in Surrogacy Custody Disputes, at 203.
103
Paul G. Arshagouni, Be Fruitful and Multiply, By Other Means, if Necessary: The Time Has
Come to Recognize and Enforce Gestational Surrogacy Agreements, at 809.
104
Unif. Parentage Act § 801(b) (amended 2002).
105
Perri Koll, The Use of the Intent Doctrine to Expand the Rights of Intended Homosexual Male
Parent in Surrogacy Custody Disputes, at 216-217.
106
Id. at 216-217.
16

When perceived in this regard, the requirement is invasive and an infringement on an
individual’s right to procreate. It is important to maintain integrity in the surrogacy process with
laws that are geared towards promoting a stable, healthy family unit and protecting the surrogate.
It is not worthwhile to prevent individuals and non-married or homosexual couples from
participating in surrogacy agreements as a means of maintaining integrity in the surrogacy
process.
The argument has also been raised that a regulation such as a home study requirement,
which is when a welfare agency would investigate the intending parents prior to approval of the
surrogacy agreement, may also conflict with one’s right to procreate.107 Such an argument is
most convincing in the situation where a committed, younger to middle aged, healthy couple
wants to start a family but must endure the more invasive requirement of a home study
investigation. In this scenario, violations of the right of privacy and the right to procreate will
likely occur. Only an infertile couple, or perhaps a homosexual couple, must undergo approval
by an outside agency before being able to procreate. This critique seems well founded. Yet, this
argument fails to consider the actual, disturbing cases that have occurred due to a lack of
statutory safeguards such a UPA’s home study requirement.
As mentioned previously, In re: the Adoption of Infants H involved a 57-year-old man
named Stephen Melinger, who wanted to become a father.108 He contacted a surrogacy agency
in Indiana, which facilitated a surrogacy arrangement between he and a woman from South
Carolina.109 The surrogate became pregnant with twin girls, which were born prematurely in
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Indiana.110 Genetically, the twins were not Melinger’s, nor the surrogate’s; the contract was
third party gestational surrogacy arrangement.111 Hospital staff contacted the state welfare
agency due to the disturbing behavior that Melinger displayed when visiting the twins in the
neonatal intensive care unit.112 Melinger brought his pet bird to the unit in one instance.113 In
another, he came to the hospital with his clothes covered in bird feces.114
Melinger was supposed to adopt the twins after their birth but due to concerns of his
mental health, the children were placed in foster care.115 Eventually, the twins were placed in his
custody by a lower court in Indiana.116 Melinger returned to New Jersey with the children while
Indiana’s welfare agency appealed the decision.117 In New Jersey, an onlooker reported
Melinger because the children looked dirty and were dressed inappropriately for cold weather.118
When the state welfare agency investigated, they found Melinger’s home to be unsanitary and to
smell strongly of urine.119 The twins were removed from Melinger’s custody.120 Indiana’s
appellate court nullified Melinger’s adoption of the twins and ordered that the adoption be
redone.121 Around the same time, a New Jersey court held that its own welfare agency had not
proved Melinger was found to be a harm to the girls and that they were to be returned to him.122
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In another disturbing case, Amy and Scott Kehoe also entered into a third party
gestational arrangement.123 Since Mrs. Kehoe was infertile, she could not supply gametes to
create a genetic link between herself and a potential child.124 The couple selected a third party
donor female to provide eggs, and instead of using Mr. Kehoe’s gametes, chose a third party
donor male to provide sperm.125 The arrangement went awry when the surrogate, Laschell
Baker, learned that Mrs. Kehoe was treated for mental illness.126 It appears that Mrs. Kehoe
suffered from psychotic disorder not otherwise specified (NOS).127 At this point, twins had been
bore by Mrs. Baker.128 The surrogate, who already had four children with her husband, filed an
order with a Michigan court seeking custody of the children.129 Despite the fact that Mrs.
Kehoe’s psychiatrist testified that she would be a fit mother, the motion was granted.130
Today, the children reside with the Baker couple.131 The Kehoes had originally named
the children Ethan and Bridget, but the Bakers decided to change their names to Peyton and
Dani.132 As of 2009, when the story of the arrangement that deteriorated between the Kehoes
and Mrs. Baker was published in the New York Times, the Baker couple did not yet have the
money to legally change the names of the children.133
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Robinson v. Hollingsworth, another surrogacy case litigated in New Jersey, involved a
gestational arrangement as well.134 Sean and Donald Hollingsworth, a married, homosexual
couple, hoped to start a family.135 Eventually they were able to when Donald’s sister, Angelia
Robinson, agreed to be a gestational surrogate for the couple.136 The arrangement was
gestational because an anonymous donor’s egg and Sean’s sperm were used to create the embryo
that was implanted into Ms. Robinson.137 Thus, Ms. Robinson had no genetic link to the twins
she eventually bore.138
The childbirth was a traumatic process for Ms. Robinson, who had to have an emergency
caesarean section, and almost died.139 Soon there after, Ms. Robinson sued for custody of the
twins despite the fact that she had signed a contract prior to implantation that gave Donald
Hollingsworth adoptive of rights of the children that she bore.140 As elicited from Baby M,
surrogacy contracts like the one that the Hollingsworth couple and Ms. Robinson signed, are
void in New Jersey due to public policy concerns.141 Therefore, the Superior Court of New
Jersey voided the agreement and awarded parental rights to Sean Hollingsworth, who had a
genetic link with the children, and Angelia Robinson, who had no genetic link to the children at
all.142
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It appears that sometime after the children were born and the Hollingsworth couple took
custody, tensions began to grow between Ms. Robinson and the couple.143 Ms. Robinson was
apparently dependent upon her brother and lived with him while he helped her get a job.144 It
was also apparent that she shared some anti-homosexual sentiments, which the court noted when
doing its best interests of the child analysis to determine custody.145 The court found that the
Hollingsworth couple provided a more stable home life for the children, and granted Mr. Sean
Hollingsworth full custody.146 Despite Ms. Robinson’s lack of a genetic link to the children and
her anti-gay views, she was still deemed the children’s legal mother and awarded visitation
rights.147
The previous cases mentioned demonstrate potential variations of gestational surrogacy
arrangements. Stephen Melinger had a third party gestational arrangement with two donors, as
did the Kehoes, while the Hollingsworth couple utilized a donor’s eggs and Sean
Hollingsworth’s sperm.148 As stated previously, an intending parent or parents using the
gestational surrogacy method should be deemed the legal parent or parents of the resulting child.
Under such a regulation, Stephen Melinger would be deemed the legal parent of the twin girls,
the Kehoes would be deemed the legal parents of the twins bore by Ms. Baker, and the
Hollingsworth couple would be deemed the legal parents of the twins bore by Ms. Robinson.
Yet, this regulation only allows a party to predict his or her legal rights and cannot alone ensure
integrity of the surrogacy process.
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One mechanism state legislatures should adopt to promote the integrity of the surrogacy
process is a home study requirement similar to § 803 of the UPA.149 As described previously, §
803 contains a waiver clause whereby a court could waive a home study investigation.150 In
order to decrease the invasiveness of the home study requirement, the waiver clause should be
the norm instead of the exception. In addition, states should adopt laws that protect the
surrogate, which would also aid in maintaining integrity in the surrogacy process. Illinois’s GSA
includes comprehensive regulation to protect the gestational surrogate by requiring her to submit
to physical and mental examinations, along with mandating that she is 21 years of age and has
previously bore a child.151 If such requirements are not met, the gestational surrogacy agreement
is unenforceable.152
In each of the presented cases, there appeared to be at least one somewhat unstable
individual partaking in the surrogacy arrangement. Although Amy Kehoe was the only one
known to have documented mental illness, the facts of the other cases suggest that something
was not copacetic regarding Mr. Melinger or Ms. Robinson.153 Mr. Melinger was an older,
single man who wore clothing covered in bird feces and brought his pet bird to a neo-natal
intensive care unit.154 Ms. Robinson appeared to be financially dependent upon her brother,
Donald Hollingsworth. It was also discovered that she harbored anti-gay sentiments despite the
fact that she agreed to be a gestational surrogate for her brother and his husband.155
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In cases that seem somewhat suspect, perhaps where an elderly individual seeks to start a
family, the benefits of the home study requirement, which would be to promote the integrity of
the surrogacy process by ensuring that a healthy, stable environment exists for children, could
outweigh the potential infringement on an individual’s right to procreate. When used only in
what seem to be exceptional cases, the proposed home study requirement may not prevent a
situation like that which occurred between the Kehoes and Mrs. Baker, since the Kehoes may
have seemed unexceptional until Mrs. Baker discovered that Mrs. Kehoe suffered from psychotic
disorder not otherwise specified. Despite this, it is necessary to maintain the balance between
the welfare of a child and one’s right to procreate, and a home study requirement that is too
invasive would shift that balance in a way that would infringe upon one’s right to procreate.
Regulations akin to those found in Illinois’s GSA, which set forth certain requirements
the gestational surrogate must meet for a surrogacy contract to be enforceable, would also help to
maintain the balance between providing a healthy, stable home environment and one’s right to
procreate. Such regulations would also protect the surrogate, which would further promote the
integrity of the surrogacy process. In the case of Robinson v. Hollingsworth, a mental
examination might have revealed Ms. Robinson’s anti-gay predilections, which may have made
the Hollingsworth couple reconsider entering into a surrogacy contract with her.
The requirement that a surrogate has previously bore a child is also an important
legislative consideration. This is because a woman who has not experienced pregnancy and
childbirth may not be fully aware of the mental and emotional, even physical feelings that may
arise in the childbearing process. These requirements, if met, would render the contract between
the intending parents and the gestational surrogate enforceable.
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The intending parents right to procreate would be infringed to the point that they could
not necessarily contract with any gestational surrogate of their choice but such requirements
could prevent potential litigation from a gestational surrogate who was mentally unstable or grew
too attached to the child during the pregnancy and birth. The absence of litigation over parental
rights, which can sometimes extend many years beyond the birth of the child, would likely
promote a healthy, stable home environment.156 An environment inundated with litigation
regarding parental rights would not likely promote a healthy, stable environment for a child.
Therefore, along with protecting the surrogate, this regulation would also strike a balance
between promoting the child’s best interests and one’s right to procreate.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The breadth of commentary calling for state legislatures to regulate surrogacy contracts is
seemingly vast.157 In particular, gestational surrogacy is one area that should be statutorily
regulated, so that parties who enter into such agreements will be able to predict their legal rights
at the outset of process. Gestational surrogacy arrangements are extremely popular and their use
will not likely decrease moving forward. 158 Courts have appeared to be more comfortable
deciding the legal outcome of gestational surrogacy arrangements, especially where there is a
genetic link between an intending parent and the child.159 In addition, Illinois’s Gestational
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Surrogacy Act comprehensively regulates gestational surrogacy arrangements.160 The intending
parent or parents, whether they used their own gametes or donor gametes, should be deemed the
legal parents of the child resulting from the gestational surrogacy arrangement.
Besides regulating gestational surrogacy contracts so that parties may be certain of their
legal rights, state legislatures should attempt to draft laws that would promote the integrity of the
surrogacy process. Legislatures should enact a home study requirement that would permit
judicial and welfare agency intervention in the gestational surrogacy process. It is recommended
that this requirement be an exception rather than the norm and that it be waived in more cases
than it is used. It would be a safeguard for cases that seem suspect and allow for a balance
between ensuring that a stable, healthy environment exists for a child and one’s constitutional
right to procreate.
Another way to maintain integrity in the surrogacy process is by creating eligibility
requirements for who can become a gestational surrogate. Legislatures should require that the
potential gestational surrogate submit to a physical and mental examination. The gestational
surrogate should be of at least twenty-one years of age and have previously bore a child for the
gestational surrogacy contract to be enforceable. Such regulations would protect the gestational
surrogate, the intending parents, and of course, the child’s best interests.
In 1986, the world’s first known gestational surrogacy agreement came to fruition.161 A
gestational surrogate gave birth to a child that was not genetically linked to her.162 Almost thirty
years later, gestational surrogacy agreements remain relatively untouched by state legislatures. It
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is time for the law to recognize the existence of gestational surrogacy and to confront the
prevailing issues stemming from gestational surrogacy agreements.
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